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*b. wage laborers
*b. bourgeoisie.
*c. the forces of production
*d. class struggle
*a. proletariat
*a. an awareness on the part of the working class of their common relationship to the means of production
*d. rational, collective
*c. the forces and relations of production; what individuals produce and how they produce it
*c. Georg W.F. Hegel
*c. alienation
*b. money
*c. class-conscious proletariat
*c. social relations of production
*b. the amount of labor time necessary to produce the commodity
*b. difference between what workers earn for their labor and the price or value of the goods they produce
*b. leads us to attribute magical, personally transforming properties to the goods we buy
*c. C-M-C
*c. capital
*c. Friedrich Engels
*b. Materialism
*c. state of savagery
*a. pairing family
*b. the state
*b. False
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
*b. False
*b. False
*b. False
*a. True
*a. True
*b. False
*b. False
*a. True
*a. True
*b. False
*b. False
Type: E
*a. Varies. Must discuss the role of private property in a capitalist system v. community property. Presents a detail description of the types of property Marx identifies. Must mention the owners of property and the owners of labor, and what each means to the communist revolution that it doesnt mean to the capitalist
Type: E
*a. Knowledge of ones place in the scheme of society as: Must list what makes class distinctions; Must list and define the evolution of society. Describing the sequence of this evolution and each phase.
Type: E
*a. List how one owning property affects the view that one has of humanity. List examples of property ownership, ideas and what people are aware of and how so. Describe the relationship of both.
Type: E
*a. Varies. Defines and describes each of the estrangement types delineating what sets them apart from each other, as types.
Type: E
*a. Varies. Discusses the relationships that money has with ownership of: goods, labor, means of production.
Type: E
*a. Varies. Examples of needs over wants, modern day and/or from Marxs time.
Type: E
*a. Varies. Discusses domestic servitude and who serves whom and for what reasons. Womens role within the family unit and their relative position to male counterparts.
Type: E
*a. Varies. Capitalist basher that was adamantly against capitalism. So far Scholars do not agree with Political Pundits that Marx hated or was against Capitalism and explains how so. Discusses how Marx is misquoted.
Type: E
*a. Hegel saw change as the motor of history. For Hegel, change was driven by a dialectical process in which a given state of being or idea contains within it the seeds of an opposing state of being or opposing idea. The resolution of the conflict produces yet a new state of being or idea. This synthesis, in turn, forms the basis of a new contradiction, thus continuing the process of change. The essence of reality lies in thought or ideas because it is only in and through the concepts that order our experiences that experiences, as such, are known. Reality is a product of our conceptual categories or consciousness and thus has no existence independent of our own construction of it.
Type: E
*a. For the wage earner, work is alienating because it serves solely to provide the means (i.e., money) for maintaining her physical existence. Instead of labor representing an end in itselfan activity that expresses our capacity to shape our lives and our relationships with othersprivate ownership of the means of production reduces the role of the worker to that of a cog in a machine. The worker is an expendable object that performs routinized tasks. Put in another way, for Marx, working just for moneyand not for the creative potential of labor itis akin to selling your soul.
Type: E
*a. A cycle of exchange Marx labeled M-C-M. By definition, the capitalist enters into economic exchange already possessing capital (raw materials, machinery for production) or, more generally, money (M). Seeking to expand her business and profits, the capitalist converts her money into a commodity (C) by purchasing additional machinery, raw materials, or labor. The capitalist then uses these commodities to produce other commodities that are then sold for money (M). Hence, the meaning of the slogan, It takes money to make money. For the proletariat, the cycle of exchange takes an inverse path. Take a typical wage earner, for example.
Type: E
*a. Commodity fetishism refers to the distorted relationship existing between individuals and the production and consumption of goods. However, in fetishizing commodities, Marx argues that we treat the goods we buy as if they have magical powers. We lose sight of the fact that we create commodities and, in doing so; grant them a power over us that in reality they do not hold. Fetishizing commodity production also prevents laborers from holding capitalists accountable for their growing dissatisfaction. Instead, workers will assign the source of their increasing exploitation not to the capitalists who benefit from it, but to the new technology.
Type: E
*a. Varies. Organization of societies is determined by both the production of the means of existence and the reproduction of the species. Engels argued that prehistoric societies had passed through two stages of developmentsavagery and barbarism. Group marriages were replaced by the pairing family consisting of one man, one woman, and their children. The advent of the pairing family effected a new division of labor in which the man took responsibility for obtaining food and, with it, ownership of the means of production. The mans power was further consolidated through overturning mother-right lines of descent. Laws of inheritance would henceforth be assigned through the male, not the female.
*b. the interactions between individuals and groups
*d. duality
*c. forms
*c. web of association
*c. The end of economic exchange.
*b. the nature of social interaction
*b. Nonrational, individual
*b. sacrifice
*b. The measure of sacrifice necessary to attain goods or goals
*a. individual, nonrational
*d. it produces solidarity and greater integration within a group
*b. Achieve unity in an interaction by resolving divergent dualisms.
*d. distraction
*a. The play form of association
*b. flirtation
*a. democratic nature
*d. Stranger
*d. shares only the most general or common features with those he interacts with
*b. European Jews
*a. simultaneously express individuality and conformity
*b. gradually goes to its doom
*c. increases its potency
*d. mimics religion
*c. A psychological device that protects the individual from becoming overwhelmed by the intensity of city life
*b. intellectualized
*b. money economy
*c. all critique modernity
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
*a. True
*a. True
*a. True
*b. False
*b. False
*b. False
*a. True
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
Type: E
*a. An overview of Simmels central sociological Ideas: (1) Simmels image of society (2) his view of sociology as a discipline (3) the plight of the individual in modern society
Type: E
*a. His emphasis on the duality existing between society and the individual led him to define sociology as the study of social interaction or, as he often called it, sociation. But it was not interaction per se that interested Simmel. Rather, he sought to analyze the forms in which interaction takes place. For instance, understanding the specific content of interactions that take place between an employer and employeewhat they talk about and whyis not of central concern to sociologists.
Nowhere is the duality between individual identity and the web of association expressed more vividly than in Simmels discussion of the nature of modern society. For Simmel, modern, urban societies allow individuals to cultivate their unique talents and interests, but at the same time also lead to a tragic leveling of the human spirit.
Type: E
*a. For him, the essence of society lies in the interactions that take place between individuals and groups. Thus, according to Simmel, society and the individuals that compose it constitute an interdependent duality. In other words, the existence of one presupposes the existence of the other.
Type: E
*a. Varies.
Type: E
*a. Simmel found in sacrifice the giving up of ones money, time, services, possessionsthe condition of all value. Hence, there can be no universal, objective standard by which value can be established.
Value, then, is always subjective and relative. It is determined by the interaction at hand in which actors weigh their desire for the goods in question against the amount of sacrifice required to attain them.
Moreover, without having to endure obstacles or some form of self denial, not even the most intensely felt desire for an object will make it valuable. Value is created out of the distance that separates desire from its satisfaction and the willingness to sacrifice something in order to overcome that distance.
Type: E
*a. Simmel called this form of interaction sociability, or the play-form of association. Sociable conversations have no significance or ulterior motive outside the encounter itself. As soon as the truthfulness of the conversations content or the striving for personal rewards or goals is made the focus, the encounter loses its playfulness. Sociability establishes an artificial world, a world without friction or inequalities.
Type: E
*a. No unique or specific qualities are shared with him that could in turn form the basis of a personal relationship. As a result, the stranger is seen not as an individual, but, rather, as a type of person whose particular characteristics make him fundamentally different from the group. This unique position of the stranger relative to the group allows him to provide services that are otherwise unattainable or unfit for the in-group to perform. In addition to these occupational consequences, the unique, unattached relation of the stranger to the larger group allows the stranger to adopt an objective attitude toward internal conflicts. Nonpartisanship grants the stranger a position of objectivity in efforts to resolve disputes.
Type: E
*a. Varies.
Type: E
*a. Varies. Describes Simmels work, Durkheims work and their comparison and contrasting points.
Type: E
*a. As a result, the metropolitan person adopts a blas attitude, a psychological device that protects the individual from becoming overwhelmed by the intensity of city life. This adaptive outlook is essentially a form of shutting down, an emotional graying of reactions. The blas attitude, while an adaptive outlook, is coupled with a money economy that further hinders the development of an emotionally meaningful life. The emphasis on exactness and calculability required by the urban, capitalist economy finds its expression in the life of the individual to the extent that he likewise becomes indifferent to the qualitative distinctions in his surroundings and in his relationships. The more money mediates our relationships and serves as the medium for self-expression, the more life itself takes on a quantitative quality.
Type: E
*a. Simmels intellectual interests spanned three disciplines: philosophy, history, and sociology (Levine 1971: xxi). Second, Simmel published works on aesthetics, ethics, religion, the philosophy of history, the philosophies of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and the metaphysics of individuality. Third, Simmel, unlike, say, Marx or Mead, did not set out to construct a coherent theoretical scheme, nor did he explicitly aim to develop a systematic critique of or to build on a specific theoretical paradigm. As a result, his work perhaps is best seen as a collection of insights
Type: E
*a. An overview of Simmels central sociological Ideas: (1) Simmels image of society (2) his view of sociology as a discipline (3) the plight of the individual in modern society. For him, the essence of society lies in the interactions that take place between individuals and groups. Thus, according to Simmel, society and the individuals that compose it constitute an interdependent duality. In other words, the existence of one presupposes the existence of the other.
Type: E
*a. For him, the essence of society lies in the interactions that take place between individuals and groups. Thus, according to Simmel, society and the individuals that compose it constitute an interdependent duality. In other words, the existence of one presupposes the existence of the other. Simmel found in sacrifice the giving up of ones money, time, services, possessionsthe condition of all value (ibid.:49). Hence, there can be no universal, objective standard by which value can be established.
Value, then, is always subjective and relative. It is determined by the interaction at hand in which actors weigh their desire for the goods in question against the amount of sacrifice required to attain them.
Type: E
*a. We do not always engage in interactions for strategic or objective purposes. Sometimes we find ourselves interacting with others simply for the sake of the connection itself. Simmel called this form of interaction sociability, or the play-form of association. Sociable conversations have no significance or ulterior motive outside the encounter itself. As soon as the truthfulness of the conversations content or the striving for personal rewards or goals is made the focus, the encounter loses its playfulness. Sociability establishes an artificial world, a world without friction or inequalities. A particular kind of sociability that epitomizes the duality of social life discussed previously is flirtation or coquetry. Flirtation is a type of erotic playfulness in which an actor continuously alters between consent and denial. Should a final decision be revealed, resolving the tension between consent and denial, the play is over. Other forms of conversation a student might use as an example: anecdotes, idle chatter, mild humor or witticisms.
Type: E
The stranger is near and far at the same time, as in any relationship based on merely universal human similarities. Between these two factors of nearness and distance, however, a peculiar tension arises, since the consciousness of having only the absolutely general in common has exactly the effect of putting a special emphasis on that which is not common. For a stranger to the country, the city, the race, and so on, what is stressed is again nothing individual, but alien origin, a quality which he has, or could have, in common with many other strangers. For this reason strangers are not really perceived as individuals, but as strangers of a certain type. Their remoteness is no less general than their nearness.
*a. Varies. The remoteness and freedom from prejudiced understanding that objectivity entails can also make the stranger a valued confidant. The stranger has elements of nearness and remotenesshe is attached, but not completelywhile the social outcast is only remote. However, despite the services that strangers are able to provide to a community, nonetheless we should be careful not to romanticize the position of this social type. Strangers often are exceptionally vulnerable to discrimination, if not violence.
Type: E
*a. The intensity of stimuli created by the urban environment and its consequences for the psychology of the city dweller. Unlike the slower tempo and rhythms of small town life and the emotional bonds that tie its inhabitants together, the metropolitan person is bombarded with sensory impressions that lead him to adopt, out of necessity, an intellectualized approach to life. In order to protect oneself against this onslaught of stimuli and disruptions, the individual must avoid developing an emotional investment in the happenings and encounters that make up his daily life. As a result, the metropolitan person adopts a blas attitude, a psychological device that protects the individual from becoming overwhelmed by the intensity of city life. This adaptive outlook is essentially a form of shutting down, an emotional graying of reactions.
*a. people actively produce and sustain meaning.
*d. bracketing
*b. lifeworld.
*b. we all share the same consciousness.
*b. An action oriented toward the past, present, or future behavior of another person.
*c. stocks of knowledge
*c. typification.
*c. refer to the realm of directly experienced social reality.
*d. habitualization
*c. intersubjectivity.
*a. institutions
*b. to patterns of apprehension in terms of which face-to-face encounters are structured.
*a. man, the producer of a world, is apprehended as its product.
*c. alienation.
*d. the process whereby individuals apprehend everyday life as an ordered, patterned reality that imposes itself upon them.
*d. effective
*c. Collective/rational
*d. standpoint
*c. Accounting practices
*d. Individual/nonrational
*c. now
*b. Conversation analysis
*a. bifurcation of consciousness
*d. socialization
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
*a. True
*a. True
*b. False
*b. False
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
*b. False
*a. True
Type: E
*a. Edmund Husserl is commonly considered the founder of phenomenology. Husserl developed what he called transcendental phenomenology, which holds that there is no pure subjective subject or pure objective object. Rather, all consciousness is consciousness of something, Husserl used the term lifeworld (Lebenswelt) to refer to the world of existing assumptions as they are experienced and made meaningful in consciousness (Wagner 1973:63). Husserl (1913) explains how intentional consciousness, that is, directing our attention in one way or another, enables the phenomenologist to reconstruct or bracket his basic views on the world and himself and explore their interconnections. In doing so, Husserl made the lifeworld, or thinking as usual in everyday life situations, a legitimate object of investigation. Phenomenology investigates the systematic bracketing of all existing assumptions regarding the external world.
Type: E
*a. Schutzs emphasis on shared consciousness and meaning recalls mile Durkheims conceptualization of collective conscience. Durkheim used this term to refer to the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society that forms a determinate system which has its own life (1893/1984:3839).2 However, in contrast to Durkheim, Schutz does not conceptualize the preorganized and pregiven elements of the lifeworld as acting on the individual with the external power of constraint. Rather, in accordance with the basic premises of symbolic interactionism (see Chapter 5), Schutz views ones natural attitude as based on the acceptance, interpretation, redefinition, and modification of cultural elements by the individual (Wagner 1973:64).
Type: E
*a. In casting interpretive understanding, or Verstehen, as the principal objective of sociology, Weber offered a distinctive counter to those who sought to base sociology on the effort to uncover universal laws applicable to all societies. Schutz sought to expand on Webers conceptualization of Verstehen and interpretive sociology (verstedhende Soziologie) by formulating his own concept of meaning. In other words, while agreeing with Weber that social science must be interpretive, Schutz finds that Weber had failed to state clearly the essential characteristics of understanding (Verstehen), of subjective meaning (gemeinter Sinn), or of action (Handeln) (Walsh:xxi).
Type: E
*a. Schutz sets out several interrelated concepts that help clarify the Weberian notion of social action and interpretive understanding. These concepts include lifeworld and intersubjectivity, discussed previously, and stocks of knowledge, recipes, and typifications. Stocks of knowledge (Erfahrung) provide actors with rules for interpreting interactions, social relationships, organizations, institutions, and the physical world. Although Schutz sometimes uses the terms recipe and typification interchangeably, typification is the process of constructing personal ideal-types based on the typical function of people or things rather than their unique features.
Type: E
*a. The elements in our stock of knowledge do not contain the same weight or value in every situation. Schutz uses the terms umwelt and mitwelt to differentiate various realms of social experience based on the level of intimacy/immediacy. Specifically, the umwelt is the realm of directly experienced social reality. Umwelt experiences (we relations) are a product of face-to-face relationships and are defined by a high degree of intimacy, as actors are in one anothers immediate copresence. By contrast, the mitwelt (world of contemporaries) is the realm of indirectly experienced social reality. In mitwelt relations, people are experienced only as types, or within larger social structures, rather than individual actors.
Type: E
*a. Habitualization, that is, the process by which the flexibility of human actions is limited. All activity is subject to habitualization, as repeated actions inevitably become routinized. Habitualization carries with it the psychological advantage that choices are narrowed. That an action may be performed again in the future in the same manner and with the same economical effort provides a stable background from which human activity can proceed (Berger and Luckmann 1966:534). Habitualized actions set the stage for institutionalization, for institutionalization occurs whenever there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized action by types of actors (Berger and Luckmann 1966:54). That is, it is when habitualized actions are shared and/or available to all members of the particular social group (ibid.) that institutions are born.
Type: E
*a. Berger and Luckmann use the terms externalization, objectivation, and reification to refer to the process by which human activity and society attain the character of objectivity. Externalization and objectivation enable the actor to confront the social world as something outside of herself. Institutions appear external to the individual, as historical and objective facticities. They confront the individual as undeniable facts. Reification is an extreme step in the process of objectivation. In reification, the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. For instance, we reify our social roles in such a way that we say, I have no choice in the matter. I have to act this way (ibid.:91). Objectivation and reification are related to the Marxist concept of alienation (Berger and Luckmann 1966:197,200).
Type: E
*a. The final step in the process of externalization, objectivation, and institutionalization is internalization. Internalization is the immediate apprehension or interpretation of an objective event as expressing meaning (1966:129), that is, the process through which individual subjectivity is attained. Internalization means that the objectivated social world is retrojected into consciousness in the course of socialization. The three moments of externalization, objectivation, and internalization are not to be understood as occurring in a temporal sequence, but rather as a simultaneous, dialectical process. Nevertheless, it is in intergenerational transmission that the process of internalization is complete.
Type: E
*a. Phenomenologists and ethnomethodologists analyze the taken-for-granted everyday world that is the basis for all human conduct. Phenomenologists seek to explain how people actively produce and sustain meaning. Ethnomethodologists focus less on meaning and subjectivity and more on the actual methods people use to accomplish their everyday lives. In contrast to phenomenology, which as indicated above has close ties to psychology and philosophy, ethnomethodology has close ties to linguistics and mainstream sociology. Ethnomethodologists are more interested in how actors assure each other that meaning is shared than the actual meaning structures themselves.
Type: E
*a. Ethnomethodologists strive for ethnomethodological indifference, an attitude of detachment that is rooted in neither intellectual navet nor condescension (Garfinkel and Sacks 1970:346). They seek to suspend belief in a rule-governed order in order to observe how the regular, coherent, connected patterns of social life are described and explained in ways that create that order itself (Zimmerman and Wieder 1970:289). That is, they seek to understand how people see, describe, and jointly develop a definition of the situation (ibid.). Students should contrast this from the structural functionalist, conflict, and interactionist perspectives as well as the sociological imagination.
Type: E
*a. Smith uses this term to refer to a separation or split between the world as you actually experience it and the dominant view to which you must adapt (e.g., a masculine point of view). The notion of bifurcation of consciousness underscores that subordinate groups are conditioned to view the world from the perspective of the dominant group, since the perspective of the latter is embedded in the institutions and practices of that world. Conversely, the dominant group enjoys the privilege of remaining oblivious to the worldview of the Other, or subordinate group, since the Other is fully expected to accommodate to them.
Type: E
ruling.
*a. Thus, Smith (1990b:6) describes relations of ruling as including not only forms such as bureaucracy, administration, management, professional organization and media, but also the complex of discourses, scientific, technical, and cultural, that intersect, interpenetrate, and coordinate them. Smith (1987:4) maintains that behind and within the apparently neutral and impersonal rationality of the ruling apparatus is concealed a male subtext. Women are excluded from the practices of power within textually mediated relations of ruling (ibid.).
Thus, for instance, official psychiatric evaluations replace the individuals actual lived experience with a means for interpreting it; the individual becomes a case history, a type, a disease, a syndrome, and a treatment possibility (Seidman 1994:216). Smith goes on to suggest that because sociology too relies on these same kinds of texts, it too is part and parcel of the relations of ruling.
Type: E
*a. Husserl used the term lifeworld (Lebenswelt) to refer to the world of existing assumptions as they are experienced and made meaningful in consciousness (Wagner 1973:63). Husserl (1913) explains how intentional consciousness, that is, directing our attention in one way or another, enables the phenomenologist to reconstruct or bracket his basic views on the world and himself and explore their interconnections. In doing so, Husserl made the lifeworld, or thinking as usual in everyday life situations, a legitimate object of investigation. Phenomenology investigates the systematic bracketing of all existing assumptions regarding the external world. Durkheim used the term collective conscience to refer to the totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average citizens of the same society that forms a determinate system which has its own life (1893/1984:3839). However, in contrast to Durkheim, Schutz does not conceptualize the preorganized and pregiven elements of the lifeworld as acting on the individual with the external power of constraint. Rather, in accordance with the basic premises of symbolic interactionism (see Chapter 5), Schutz views ones natural attitude as based on the acceptance, interpretation, redefinition, and modification of cultural elements by the individual (Wagner 1973:64). Schutz sought to expand on Webers conceptualization of Verstehen and interpretive sociology (verstedhende Soziologie) by formulating his own concept of meaning. Starting with Webers conceptualization of action as behavior to which a subjective meaning is attached, and drawing heavily on Husserl (as well as Bergson), Schutz envisions social action as an action oriented toward the past, present, or future behavior of another person or persons.
Type: E
*a. Stocks of knowledge (Erfahrung) provide actors with rules for interpreting interactions, social relationships, organizations, institutions, and the physical world. Schutz (1970:98) also refers to stocks of knowledge as cookery-book knowledge. Just as a cookbook has recipes and lists of ingredients and formulas for making something to eat, so, too, we all have a cookbook of recipes, or implicit instructions, for accomplishing everyday life. Indeed, according to Schutz (1970:99), most of our daily activities, from rising to going to bed, are performed by following recipes reduced to automatic habits or unquestioned platitudes. Although Schutz sometimes uses the terms recipe and typification interchangeably, typification is the process of constructing personal ideal-types based on the typical function of people or things rather than their unique features. Schutzs conceptualization of typification is more individualistic and interactive than the collectivistic sociological notion of stereotype. While stereotypes are, by definition, pregiven and somewhat stagnant or fi
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